What drives pricing competition on the Internet? According to many, information is the key driver of e-tailer pricing. Comparative pricing data are widely available to shoppers from sites such as pricescan.com or mysimon.com. Consequently, customers can quickly locate the lowest prices available on the Internet. At the same time, e-tailers can easily change their prices in response to consumer demand or competitors' moves, which they can monitor with little effort. Sinha (2000) suggested that the availability of price information to customers and competitors should drive prices down and quickly narrow any gap between etailers' prices.
Although there is a great deal of speculative and normative writing on Internet pricing, there are only a handful of empirical studies examining the degree and nature of price competition in Internet markets. The focus of these studies is to document the degree of price dispersion in various markets (Bailey 1998; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000) or to explain cross-sectional variations in prices using measures of service differences across e-tailers (e.g., Clay et al. 2002; Clemons, Hann, and Hitt 2002; Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar 2002) .
In this article, we focus on understanding Internet price competition over time. Using prior research, we develop a descriptive model of dynamic pricing competition between two types of Internet competitors: pure e-tailers and hybrid e-tailers. Unlike traditional retailers, pure e-tailers are not constrained by limitations of time or geography because they compete only in cyberspace. Hybrid e-tailers are the online face of established companies such as wholesalers, catalog retailers, or manufacturers. We argue that the pricing objectives of these two types of e-tailers are driven by factors such as switching costs, returns to scale, and discount rates. We consider how changes in the stock market affected the discount rates for pure e-tailers and the resulting impact this change had on their pricing objectives and the posted prices of both types of e-tailers.
To test our model, we used a longitudinal database of computer printer prices spanning the period before and after the dot.com crash in April 2000. We find that our model correctly predicts the direction and magnitude of changes in prices coinciding with the changes in the stock market. The model we estimate in this study shows how changes in financial markets can affect pricing competition among Internet retailers.
In the next section, we present our descriptive model in detail. We follow with a description of our data and our empirical model formulation. We then present the results of our empirical study and discuss the implications of our research.
A MODEL OF INTERNET PRICE COMPETITION
In Figure 1 , we present our descriptive model. In this section, we describe the various elements of the model and the testable hypotheses arising from them.
Business Model
The initial element in our framework is the business model of the particular e-tailer. The most well known Internet company is Amazon.com, the archetype of the pure e-tailer, that is, a retailer that generates all of its value creation through online retailing. A pure e-tailer is one of the new business models arising from the commercialization of the Internet. In contrast, hybrid e-tailers (e.g., Dell.com or cdw.com) are a combination of online retailing and some other value-generating activity. This could include wholesaling, manufacturing, catalog retailing, or brick-and-mortar stores.
Although appearing similar to online shoppers, there are significant differences between pure and hybrid etailers. Specifically, there are a number of factors that provide opportunities or impose constraints for a particular type of e-tailer. Because these factors determine which pricing objective is appropriate for a particular type of etailer, we will refer to them as determinants.
A number of researchers have discussed the relationship between pricing objectives and their determinants (for a review, see Noble 1997) . Some determinants are firm specific (e.g., experience curve effects-Day and Montgomery 1983), whereas others affect all firms in a given industry (e.g., inelastic total demand- Guiltinan, Paul, and Madden 1997) . In this article, we focus on three important determinants of pricing objectives for firms competing for customers who make repeated purchases over time. These determinants are switching costs, increasing returns to scale, and the firm's discount rate.
Each of these determinants confers some cost or demand advantage depending on the e-tailer's business model. Differences in the determinants across the two types of e-tailers motivate them to choose very different pricing objectives and, therefore, price levels in the marketplace. We discuss each of the determinants in detail next.
Determinants
Switching costs. In his comprehensive review of the research on switching costs, Klemperer (1995) showed how customer switching costs provide firms some pricing leverage over their customers who are repeat buyers. In general, the presence of switching costs implies that a firm's current market share is an important determinant of its future profitability (p. 515).
To illustrate the importance of switching costs to an etailer's pricing objective, consider the generic situation of competition between a new supplier and an established business. In the presence of switching costs and in a growing market, the established business faces a complex pricing decision. In every period, it has a choice of whether to charge a low or high price.
The new supplier is trying to build up its customer base. We can reasonably assume that it will charge a low price to attract new customers coming into the market. The new supplier "locks in" their future purchases because these customers would wish to avoid incurring the cost to switch suppliers (Klemperer 1995, p. 523) .
If the established business charges a low price, it can compete for the new customers coming into the market with the new supplier. These additions to the established business's customer base will become valuable repeat purchasers. At the same time, a low price would keep current customers from switching to the new supplier. By charging a lower price, the established business sacrifices its current profits from both new and existing customers in order to capture a share of the growth in demand. The expectation is that these new customers will continue to purchase from the established business to avoid incurring a switching cost.
On the other hand, the established business may decide to charge a high price. This would result in most of the new customers choosing the new supplier. However, as long as the price is not too high, the established business would retain its current customers. These customers continue to purchase from the established business to avoid incurring the costs of switching to the new supplier. This approach would maximize revenue from existing customers but provide no new growth (Klemperer 1995) .
This example illustrates the impact of switching costs on a business's decision to either compete for new customers or focus on current profits, especially those arising from its existing customers. In the absence of switching costs, there is no pricing decision for the established business because customers could switch suppliers every period depending on which firm (new or established) had the lower price (Valdes 2002) .
According to speculative writing on the subject, this is the very situation that Internet e-tailers face every day (Sinha 2000) . However, in reality, Internet shoppers do face a range of switching costs when deciding to change from one e-tailer to another. They have to learn a new interface, search engine, or checkout procedure (Lohse and Spiller 1998) . A study of online search behavior by Johnson et al. (2000) suggests that mutual learning on the part of the consumer and the Web site (e.g., customization, personalized recommendations, etc.) may lead to substantial differences in searching and ordering costs between Web sites (pp. 19-20) .
There are also psychological costs associated with trust, especially with respect to transaction history and credit card information (Alba et al. 1997; Urban, Sultan, and Qualls 2000) . A 1999 study by BCG found that credit card fraud was the number one concern among active Internet shoppers (Kane 2000) . Therefore, a successful purchase and billing experience with a given Web site should increase switching costs for online shoppers seeking to change suppliers.
In the context of our framework, consider that hybrid etailers start off having a much larger base of repeat customers compared with the pure e-tailers. Therefore, the pricing objectives of the two types of e-tailers would be different. Pure e-tailers would seek to rapidly increase their customer base through low prices. Once these customers have made a purchase, the pure e-tailer would try to retain these customers to benefit from repeat purchases over time.
With respect to a hybrid e-tailer, its pricing objective would be different. It would have as its goal leveraging its relationship with its base of current customers. The Internet would be used as a new communications channel rather than a mechanism for recruiting new customers 
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Pure e-tailer (Barsh, Crawford, and Grosso 2000, pp. 101-2) . Consider that customers of hybrid e-tailers already know about the quality of the service they can expect from their offline counterparts, whereas service quality of pure e-tailers is unknown. These customers have experience with the shipping, delivery, and payment processes of the hybrid etailers. This implies that the switching costs for customers of hybrid e-tailers are likely to be higher than those of the customers of pure e-tailers.
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In addition, many of the benefits of the Internet for hybrid e-tailers come more from supply chain savings rather than from attracting new customers (Reichheld and Schefter 2000) . For example, Office Depot finds that it saves money using the Internet rather than its traditional catalogs, which are costly to print and distribute as well as difficult to keep current. It estimates that orders through its Web site cost less than half of those by phone (Gulati and Garino 2000, p. 109) .
Therefore, we expect that hybrid e-tailers will charge higher prices to maximize profits from the relationships they have with their existing customers, whereas pure etailers will charge a low price to build up their customer base.
Returns to scale. A major recent development in economics is the realization that many industries are characterized by increasing returns to scale whether scale is measured using firm size or market share (Arthur 1996) . This is a major departure from the assumption of decreasing returns to scale in traditional microeconomic theory. Increasing returns to scale have important implications for competition over time.
For example, in a technology product market, a small initial lead in sales by one variant of a new technology can lead to its becoming the industry standard. Such was the case with operating systems for microcomputers. As one version gained early favor with customers (i.e., MSDOS), it also attracted the attention of more software developers and hardware makers. Their attention, in turn, made the operating system more attractive to more buyers because it ran more software and ran on more hardware platforms. The competition among hardware makers drove down the combined cost of the hardware/software system. These effects reinforced the early lead of a particular variant and resulted in increasing returns to market share (Arthur 1996) .
The best-known examples of increasing returns are from high-technology markets such as software, faxes, computer chips, and so on. However, these same effects are often observed in service industries (Arthur 1996) . Services with high levels of fixed costs such as insurance and banking can enjoy some degree of increasing returns to scale by spreading their fixed costs over as large a customer base as possible. Franchised service providers in food service or lodging may enjoy increased returns to size as well. Their ubiquity drives demand for an even greater numbers of outlets so patrons can enjoy the same level of service quality regardless of geographic location.
Service businesses that exchange software technology for human contact are more likely to enjoy the benefits of increasing returns (Arthur 1996) . Such is the case with Internet e-tailers. The traditional retailing functions of merchandizing, selling, order taking, and inventory control are all handled by centralized software systems.
For pure e-tailers, all of their systems had to be developed from the ground up because these organizations are start-up businesses. However, the high development cost of the software and other technological systems should be reasonably fixed. In such a case, the larger the customer base, the lower the unit cost to serve every customer.
The effects of increasing returns to size are more pronounced for pure than hybrid e-tailers. All sales by a pure e-tailer go toward realizing the benefit of increasing returns. In contrast, the Internet systems of the hybrid etailer are often additions to existing inventory and ordering (e.g., telephone-based) systems. This difference reduces the need for the hybrid e-tailer to try to realize the benefits of increasing returns to scale because the effect of increasing returns would be less noticeable within the context of the larger, established organization.
Consequently, we expect that the pricing objective for pure e-tailers will focus on acquiring customers in order to spread its fixed costs over as large a customer base as possible in as short a time as possible. This would imply that pure e-tailers would charge lower prices (than hybrid etailers) in order to more rapidly realize the potential of increasing returns to scale (Arthur 1996, p. 105) .
Discount rates.
In markets where customers cannot switch suppliers instantaneously due to switching costs, brand loyalty, long-term contracts, or simple purchasing inertia, firms face a trade-off between maximizing revenues from current customers or attracting new customers who will yield increased profits in the future (Valdes 2002) . Because this problem is one of current versus future realization of revenues, it should be modeled as a series of cash flows, discounted to the current period.
It should come as no surprise that the discount rate faced by a firm has a large impact on its decision to maximize revenues from current versus future purchases in markets with switching costs. Specifically, Valdes (2002) showed that at higher discount rates, the firm gains more from charging a higher price to maximize revenue from current customers. This result holds even though the firm will be sacrificing market share and the future stream of profits that new customers could have brought to the firm.
For Internet e-tailers, their business model determined their access to external capital and, therefore, the discount rate they use to make pricing decisions. The funding sources for pure e-tailers were usually some combination of venture capital and proceeds from an initial public offering (IPO) of stock. In contrast, hybrid e-tailers funded development of their Web operations from existing operations.
Before April 2000, stock market valuations for Internet companies continually set new highs, regardless of their profitability or lack thereof. By early 2000, the total market capitalization of Internet companies was more than $1.1 trillion, of which 15% were e-tailers with an estimated market capitalization $150 billion (Rosen and Howard 2000) . Due to these market valuations, pure etailers had ready access to an inexpensive supply of private venture capital and public capital from the equity markets. For example, in the first quarter of 2000, 38 publicly traded Internet companies, most of which had not yet turned a profit, raised $16 billion in secondary stock offerings (Willoughby 2000) .
The run-up in stock prices of Internet companies during this period resulted in discount rates for pure e-tailers that were much lower than those of hybrid e-tailers. In fact, many analysts argue that the cost of capital for Internet companies at this time was near zero (Baker 2001; Marathon 1999; Rock 2000; Rosen and Howard 2000; Veverka 2000) .
Due to their access to inexpensive capital, pure e-tailers should value future profits more highly than current profits, whereas hybrid e-tailers would have the opposite view. Hybrid e-tailers have other business activities interests that compete for the resources being dedicated to pursuing online sales. Consequently, these online ventures would have to provide the same returns as alternative uses within the company. The difference in discount rates between pure and hybrid e-tailers also helps determine their choice of pricing objectives to emphasize profits now (hybrid etailers) or in the future (pure e-tailers).
Pricing Objectives and Price Levels
We formalize the discussions above about the relationships between business models, determinants, pricing objectives, and price levels in our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Due to differences in switching costs, increasing returns to scale, and discount rates, we expect that the prices charged by pure e-tailers are lower than those charged by hybrid e-tailers.
Two of the determinants driving the price differences between types of e-tailers do not change over time. Hybrid e-tailers started off with an existing base of customers, whereas pure e-tailers did not. In addition, increasing returns to scale remain more important to pure e-tailers because all of their business was conducted online. However, the discount rates faced by pure e-tailers did undergo a significant change in early 2000. We discuss this change and its expected impact on pricing objectives and price competition next.
Stock Market Dynamics
In April 2000, the attitude of equity markets toward the Internet sector changed dramatically. Prior to this period, the valuation of Internet companies seemed to be based more on the number of visitors to a site than the revenue their visits generated (King 2000) . The reasoning at the time held that Web sites would soon transform the "hits" from their visitors into purchases. However, an influential report in Barron's in March 2000 (Willoughby 2000) showed that at the current rate of expenditures, many pure e-tailers would be out of cash completely within months.
The stock market response to this news was dramatic. From its highs in March 2000, the Philadelphia Internet Index (symbol: DOT) of the top 25 Internet companies fell more than 33% by the end of April. In the wake of this "dot.com crash," several high-profile IPOs were canceled. At the same time that access to public funding was curtailed, the supply of private venture capital also dried up (Helmore 2000) . Pure e-tailers found themselves in a changed financial environment-one in which their access to inexpensive capital was curtailed and the discount rate they should use for financial decisions, including pricing, increased dramatically (Rock 2000) .
From the discussion above, it is clear that pure e-tailers should be expected to raise their prices because current profits had become more important than those in the future. The question is, What will be the response of the hybrid e-tailers to this change in the financial markets? We find an answer in a duopoly model of price competition by Arthur and Ruszczynski (1994) .
In this model, there are two competitors, one with increasing returns to market share and one without. [This roughly parallels the differences between pure and hybrid e-tailers.] When discount rates are low, the firm with increasing returns to share sets its price low in order to build market share quickly. At the same time, the firm without the benefits of increasing returns charges a similar low price in order to compete for customers. Ultimately, the firm with increasing returns tends to dominate the market over time.
When discount rates are increased, the situation changes radically. When interest rates are high, the firm with increasing returns to share does not capture most of the customers. It is very likely to split the market (50% share for each) with the firm that does not have increasing returns to share. Furthermore, price levels are very differ-ent when discount rates are high. For both firms, their prices are much higher compared to the low discount rate situation (Arthur and Ruszczynski 1994, pp. 175-79) .
Applying these results to e-tailer price competition, we expect that pure e-tailers will increase their prices when their discount rate increased in response to changes in the financial markets. This raising of prices by pure e-tailers would reduce the pricing pressure on hybrid e-tailers. Therefore, we expect that hybrid e-tailers would also increase their prices, after the change in the financial markets, in pursuit of increased profitability. This leads to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Prices for both pure and hybrid e-tailers will increase after the dot.com crash.
The changes in the financial markets should affect both the pricing objective of the pure e-tailers as well as its discount rate. Rather than pursuing growth, we expect that pure e-tailers will change their focus to concentrate on current profitability. Consistent with Arthur and Ruszczynski (1994) , we expect that pure e-tailers will increase their prices more than hybrid e-tailers after the dot.com crash since they started at a lower level. This leads to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Pure e-tailers will increase their prices more than hybrid e-tailers after the dot.com crash.
Price Dispersion
What will be the overall effect of these changes on price dispersion in the market? Measuring and modeling price dispersion has been a very active area of research on Internet pricing. Some studies have focused on documenting the degree of price dispersion in Internet markets in an effort to measure their overall efficiency compared to offline retail markets (Bailey 1998; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000) . More recent studies have tried to explain price dispersion using cross-sectional measures of differences in Web site features (Clay et al. 2002) , product attributes (Clemons, Hann, and Hitt 2002) , or customer satisfaction measures (Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar 2002) . None of these existing studies track changes in prices over time. In addition, the determinants of price dispersion included in these studies are under the control of the e-tailers.
Our dynamic model above suggests that price dispersion may also be affected over time due to changes in the financial markets. Specifically, an increase in the discount rate for pure e-tailers due to higher costs of capital will lead to a change in their pricing objective. Because both types of e-tailers will be pricing for profitability rather than one type pursuing growth in its customer base, price dispersion will be significantly lower after the dot.com crash than before. This is our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Price dispersion will be lower after the dot.com crash than before.
In the next section, we describe our empirical test of these hypotheses using a longitudinal database of prices from the computer printer market.
EMPIRICAL STUDY
The setting for our empirical study is the computer printer market. Selling computer-oriented products (systems, peripherals, and software) is one of the most established areas of Internet commerce. Compared to many products that are the subjects of Internet pricing studies, computer peripherals are big-ticket items. The unit costs for these products range from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. According to economic theory, expensive items such as electronic products and automobiles should have low levels of price dispersion (Stigler 1961, Smith, Bailey and Brynjolfsson 1999) . This is the result of more searching on the part of consumers for the lowest price available. With more consumers searching for low prices (and eventually finding them), prices should be relatively similar across all retailers because high-priced suppliers will either have to lower prices to gain customers or go out of business.
The data consist of daily prices posted in nine Internet stores from early February to mid-August 2000. The data are proprietary data and were provided to us by a commercial marketing research company. For the reason of confidentiality, the store names cannot be divulged.
Two of the stores are pure e-tailers. Both of these Web sites positioned themselves as having the lowest prices available on the Internet. They claimed that they would refund any difference in price if a customer found another Internet stores that sold the same product below their price within 24 hours of a sale. The other seven stores in the sample are hybrid e-tailers with other revenue streams from catalog sales, manufacturing revenues, and so on. This sample of nine stores accounts for almost all of the on-line sales of the products that are the subject of our study.
We model the posted prices of three best-selling products sold by a major computer printer manufacturer. For reasons of confidentiality, we cannot disclose either the manufacturer or the models that are the subject of our analysis. However, the price comparisons were made at the model level. In other words, the prices we examined were for identical products across all of the e-tailers in our sample.
Modeling Price Changes Over Time
To model the impact of changes in the financial environment on the pricing of e-tailers, we divided our data into two time periods. The first covers the period before the dot.com crash from Figure 2 .
We identified the start of the dot.com crash using the same method as technical stock analysts. On April 17, 2000, the Philadelphia Internet Index fell to a point that it crossed below the index's 200-day moving average for the first time. Such events usually indicate the beginning of a prolonged down market, as was the case in this situation.
In Figures 3, 4 and 5, we plot two price time series for each product with an indication of the point in time of the dot.com crash as defined above. One time series corresponds to the average price for the pure e-tailers, whereas the other indicates the average price for the hybrid etailers.
We see that the price trend for all products and both types of e-tailers is increasing after the dot.com crash.
One possible explanation for these patterns in the data would be an increase in the wholesale prices charged to the e-tailers. To investigate this possibility, we collected the weekly wholesale prices from the manufacturer for the three products above. For Products 1 and 2, there was no price change during the entire time period of our study. For Product 3, there was a very small increase ($10) in the wholesale price. However, the changes we observe above are much larger than the concurrent increase in the wholesale price. Consequently, we can eliminate price increases as an explanation of the price increases after the dot.com crash in the above figures.
To test the hypotheses derived from our model, we estimated a cross-sectional, time-series model with posted price as the dependent variable. The detailed formulation and results are discussed next.
Model Formulation
Our data have both time-series and cross-sectional elements. To test for differences across types of e-tailers and across fixed time periods (before/after the dot.com crash), we pooled the data across all e-tailers. It is likely that prices from the same e-tailer are correlated and prices on the same day are also correlated. Of the few models that could account for these conditions including Fuller and Battese (1974) , we chose the Da Silva (1975) approach because it also corrects for serial correlation. For a recent application of this methodology, see Hayes and Ross (1998) .
We model prices using the following formulation:
where P i, t is the posted price at the ith e-tailer on day t. There are J independent variables, and u i, t is the error term, which will be discussed in detail. The J independent variables in this model are two dummy variables and an interaction term. The first dummy variable (X1) indicates the type of e-tailer (1 = pure e-tailer, 0 = hybrid e-tailer). The second dummy variable indicates the time period (1 = after the dot.com crash, 0 = before the dot.com crash). The interaction term (X3) is the product of the two dummy variables for type of etailers and time period.
Following DaSilva (1975) , the error term is decomposed into three components.
where v i are firm-specific effects that vary over the i firms and e t are time-specific effects that vary across time. These error terms reflect the impact of omitted variables. For example, v i captures variations in services provided or customer satisfaction ratings across e-tailers such as those FIGURE 2 Doc.com Crash modeled in cross-sectional studies of Internet price dispersion (Clay et al. 2002; Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar 2002) .
Other research using longitudinal data shows that these variations across firms do not change greatly over time (Cao 2002) . Therefore, this formulation controls for the unmeasured differences in the buyers' experiences at these online stores.
If ε i, t is assumed to be time-independent, then the Fuller and Battese (1974) 
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have a first-degree serial correlation, then the model of variance-component moving average error process proposed by DaSilva (1975) could be used for estimation. Specifically, the error terms are specified as follows:
The DaSilva method estimates the regression parameters using a two-step generalized least squares (GLS)-type estimator. The TSCSREG procedure (from Statistical Analysis System or SAS) analyzes the time-series and cross-sectional data sets that consist of multiple timeseries observations on each of the cross-sectional elements (i.e., individual e-tailers).
Model Results
Each model was estimated separately for each of the three products using the SAS TSCSREG procedure. We estimated two models for each product, one with and one without the interaction term (X3). The results are given in Table 1 . We report the t-statistics (in parentheses) under the estimated coefficients.
For every product, the inclusion of the interaction term (X3) reduced the model's mean square error (MSE). The MSE decreases almost 15% for Products 1 and 3. For all products, the coefficient of the intercept term is significantly different from zero. Overall, we conclude that the model incorporating the interaction term provides a better fit to the data.
For each of the three products, the coefficients for etailer type (pure e-tailer = 1) are significantly negative. This indicates that the average price for the pure e-tailers was significantly lower than the average price for the hybrid e-tailer. The average overall difference in price ranged from 10% to 15%. Thus, we find strong support for Hypothesis 1.
The coefficients for time period (before/after the dot.com crash) are significantly positive, which indicates that both types of e-tailers raised their prices after April 17, 2000. This might be a somewhat surprising result because we typically expect that prices for high-technology products such as computer printers fall over time. As noted above, the average price increases of Product 3 for both types of e-tailers were much larger than the $10 increase in wholesale prices. Therefore, these results support Hypothesis 2.
The coefficients for the interaction term between etailer type and time period are positive (and statistically significant) across all three products. This is consistent with a greater increase in prices by pure e-tailers after April 17, 2000. On average, the hybrid e-tailers raised their prices between 1% and 7%, whereas the pure e-tailers raised their prices on average from 4% to 16%. Therefore, we have strong support for Hypothesis 3.
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In addition to changes in the price levels of these products, we are also interested in how the degree of price competition as indicated by price dispersion changed over time. We present these results next.
Measuring Price Dispersion
To measure price dispersion, we use the coefficient of variation, which is defined as the ratio of standard deviation of price and mean price computed across all of the etailers in the sample. This measure allows us to meaningfully compare the degree of price dispersion across products in our sample and compare our results with those of other researchers.
The coefficient of variation for the three computer peripheral products for the entire period of February 2000 to August 2000 ranged from 3.51% to 7.32% for two of the computer peripheral products. The range is slightly higher (up to 9.65%) for the third product. Smith, Bailey, and Brynjolfsson (1999) suggested that the price dispersion of high-priced products sold on the Internet would be lower than those found in Bailey's (1998) study of books, CDs, and software. In his study, the coefficient of variation was between 7.4% and 9.8%. Our results support this conjecture because the range of price dispersion for the computer peripherals does not overlap that of the market basket of books tracked by Bailey (1998) .
With respect to Hypothesis 4, we compared the mean coefficient of variation (CV) between the two time periods (before and after the dot.com crash) for all three products.
The mean CV for Product 1 fell from 6.13% to 4.7%. For Product 2, there was little change from 5.4% to 4.9%. The largest change was observed for Product 3, which saw the mean CV fall from 7.1% to 4.6%. Because all of these changes were statistically significant, our results support Hypothesis H4.
DISCUSSION
The goal of this article is to better understand the nature of price competition among Internet e-tailers. Building on prior research on dynamic pricing competition, we developed a descriptive model that shows how differences in switching costs, increasing returns to scale, and discount rates affect the pricing objectives of different types of etailers. Using this descriptive model, we developed a series of hypotheses about the price differences between pure and hybrid e-tailers and the direction and magnitude of changes in their prices in response to stock market dynamics. We validated the predictions of our model using a longitudinal database of computer printer prices during a 7-month period in 2000, a time in which the discount rate for pure e-tailers changed drastically.
Although the setting for this study is a particular set of e-tailers during an arguably unique time in business history, this study makes two interesting contributions. First, this study provides further confirmation of the linkage between changes in the financial markets and Internet prices, the subject of a great deal of anecdotal reporting during the summer of 2000. The second contribution of this study is related to the role of price dispersion as a measure of price competition in Internet markets. We discuss the contributions and limitations of this study in detail next.
The Role of Financial Markets in Internet Pricing
These data are the first longitudinal confirmation of the effects of the dot.com crash on the prices that customers encountered while shopping on the Internet. In the summer and fall of 2000, there were a large number of articles on the relationship between the dot.com crash and Internet pricing. With titles such as "Bargains on Web Fade as Retailers Push for Profits" (Kaufman, 2000) , these articles Quick (2000) supplied the example of a DVD player previously offered on buy.com for $1,499 that was priced at $1,749 in June 2000. Kirkpatrick (2000) reported that Amazon.com raised its prices 10% across the board in the summer of 2000 in response to concurrent declines in its stock price. Rivals BN.com and Borders.com followed this price increase. The plunge in the prices of Internet stocks combined with "a general drying up of fresh venture capital for online retail" are suggested as the motivations for e-tailers raising prices, including Outpost.com (Hamilton 2000) . As a group, these articles provided anecdotal evidence of prices increasing online in response to the reduction in the availability of capital for Internet e-tailers. These news reports were limited to reporting on a few products or a few Web sites because "there is no official entity that tracks web prices" (Kaufman 2000) . Our results are an important verification of the impact of the financial markets on prices online. Our data include daily measures of prices that, as one can see in Figures 2 through 4 , can be very volatile in a short time span. This volatility makes any conclusions drawn from an analysis of a single cross section of Internet prices potentially misleading.
In contrast to niche products such as the Tag Hauer watches cited above, these data cover three of the bestselling printers in the market. Consequently, changes in their price levels have a substantial impact on a large number of customers. In addition, these data contain observations across the e-tailers that account for virtually all online sales of these products. On the other hand, our analysis is limited to a small set of important products in a single e-tailing category. These results might not generalize to other categories.
The data we had available did allow us to control for changes in wholesale prices as a cause for the changes in on-line prices we observed. However, we do not have information available to rule out alternative explanations such as changes in the prices charged offline by hybrid etailers or pure brick-and-mortar competitors. Nor are we able to rule out the effect of changes in prices of competing products, that is, other printers.
Understanding Internet Price Dispersion
The results of our study provide an important contribution to the continuing stream of research on Internet price dispersion. Our results using longitudinal data show the inadequacy of using price dispersion alone as a measure of the degree of price competition in a market. As we have shown in Table 2 , the degree of price dispersion was significantly lower after the dot.com crash.
Normally, we would interpret this as an increase in competitive intensity. In the typical price dispersion model, some firms are offering the product at a low price, that is, the "perfectly competitive" price, whereas other firms offer the same product at a high price. Such firms are either taking advantage of information asymmetries among consumers (Stigler 1961) or are at some cost disadvantage (Shepard 1991) or have a brand equity advantage (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000) .
However, our regression analysis shows that the overall price levels for the products in our study actually increased after the dot.com crash. Rather than moving toward the lower, "competitive" level, prices for these products actually moved above the expected "high" price, whereas price dispersion was decreasing.
Therefore, to understand price competition within a market, using price dispersion alone can be very misleading. Both price dispersion and price levels have to be measured over time to properly characterize changes in the intensity of Internet price competition.
The advantage of using daily price data comes at a cost of generalizability. Although our price data for these three printer models are quite complete for the time period, the scope of our analysis is very narrow. Compared to other studies of price dispersion, we have fewer products, categories, and Web sites.
CONCLUSIONS
The descriptive model we estimated in this article illustrates the importance of changes in discount rates in determining the pricing objectives and price levels of a small set of Internet e-tailers. Although these results are rather limited, they do suggest some interesting areas for future research.
Discount rates are key drivers of competition between e-tailers because each firm has to decide whether to emCao, Gruca / INTERNET PRICE COMPETITION 11 phasize profits from current customers or profits in the future from new customers. This trade-off between current and future profitability is central to the pricing problems in any service business where consumers face switching costs. These settings include technology-intensive services such as cable and satellite television, peopleintensive services including hair styling or health care and a wide range of banking and financial services. In cases like wireless phone services, some of the switching costs are created by the firms themselves (via long-term contracts), whereas others are based on the technical limitations of the equipment (e.g., digital vs. analog handsets). For a recent review of the nature of switching costs, see Jones, Mothersbaugh, and Beatty (2002) . For managers, the relationship between pricing competition and the financial markets we found in our data may provide an additional factor to consider when trying to understand the pricing behavior of competitors. There are several financial characteristics of a competitor that may shape its pricing and other marketing behavior. A competitor's capital structure (debt vs. equity) may affect its discount rate or its investment horizon. Another example involves the form of incorporation. Consider that U.S. credit unions are able to offer lower interest rates and other charges for financial services than competing local banks due, in part, to the preferential tax rates associated with their nonprofit status.
The interrelationships between financial strategy and marketing strategies including pricing are not well understood. Future research should focus on how financial decisions (capital structure, ownership, etc.) either constrain or enable marketing decisions. In this article, we started with the linkage between pricing and financial markets through the mechanism of discount rates. More research in this area is needed, especially in service markets with high levels of fixed investment and low unit costs (cable TV, telecom, Internet access) where effective pricing is a major determinant of firm profitability.
